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HEART AND SOUL IN ARISTOTLE 
Theodore Tracy, S.J. 
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle 
Under this rather sentimental sounding title I should like to recall a 
critical problem in Aristotle's psychology, trace briefly some of the discussion 
of that problem, and suggest a few considerations which, if not entirely original, 
may at least advance the discussion along lines already suggested by others. The 
problem is, of course, that which Francois Nuyens raised over twenty five years 
ago (L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote, Louvain, 1948) when he declared 
Aristotle's famous definition of the soul in De Anima (=DA)* 412b5-6 to be "abso­
lument incompatible" (p. 165) with the notionof the soulpresent "in the heart" 
and operating principally through the heart, a notion he finds prominent in some 
of the Parva Naturalia (=PN) and the majority of the biological works. This in­
compatibility, assumed throughout Nuyens' study (45, 47, 55-58, 119, 159-171, etc.), 
served as his chief criterion for dividing Aristotle's works chronologically into 
those of an earlier "transitional period" and those of the "terminal period" of 
hylomorphism. 
Nuyens' use of a single criterion for distributing the works chronologically 
promised an advantage over the procedure of Jaeger, who dependeci upon particular 
internal criteria established for each treatise. Nuyens' work was acclaimed and 
accepted substantially by some very great scholars, notably by Augustin Mansion 
and Sir David Ross, along with Drossaart Lulofs, Pierre Louis, Barbotin, Gauthier, 
D. A. Rees, and others (see w. Fortenbaugh, "Recent Scholarship in the Psychology 
of Aristotle," CW 60, 1967, 318-20). Ingemar o\iring, in his article on Aristotle 
published in Pauly,-Wissowa (Suppl. XI, 253-54) in 1968, expressed the judgment 
that Nuyens' position at that time could "als die herrschende Meinung betrachtet 
werden." Yet even while Dllring1s article was being written, the most searching 
critiques of Nuyens' view, especially as adopted by Ross, were already in print. 
Objections to details of Nuyens' work had been raised, of course, from the 
time of its publication. But the first serious challenge to the validity of his 
main criterion seems to have been published by Irving Block in his paper on "The 
Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings" in 1961 (AJP 82, 50-77). Block 
argued first that A.'s definition of soul as form or entelechy of the body does 
not logically forbid him to emphasize a particular organ as source of the acti­
vities whereby the body lives. Secondly, Block analyzed the passages from the 
� Sensu (=DSen) cited by Ross as illustrating a "two substance theory of body and 
soul" and provided alternative interpretations and arguments to show that these 
statements could be reconciled with the hylomorphic view of soul. Thirdly, 
Block here first called attention in print to the important passage in Metaphysics 
(=M) Zeta (1035bl4 ff.) where A. speaks clearly of the soul as "form and essence 
of-the body" and at the same time refers to it as being present primarily in a 
dominant organ of the body, thereby indicating that these notions, absolutely 
incompatible for Nuyens, apparently were not so for A. Block's effort in this 
part of his paper was largely negative, countering the arguments of Ross espe­
cially, yet providing solid evidence that the "entelechy view" and the "heart 
view" were not incompatible in A.'s mind. Two years later Marjorie Grene's 
� Portrait_E..f Aristotle appeared (Chicago, 1963), presenting further evidence 
*The following symbols will be used in referring to the works of. Aristotle (=A.): 
DA=De Anima; DGA=De Gen. Animalium; DJuv=De Juventute; DMA=De Motu Animalium; �De 
ResP'iratione; OOem=D�oria; DPA=D;-Pa°rt. Animalium; DSen=De �su; DSom=De Somno; 
M=Metaphysica; PN=P�va Natural� �ss DA and PN refer to his editions. 
-���·_: '-': ': ,·:-· -', -: _, _-. 
�i�y�ns • view by pointing out (p. 3 5} that both the hylomorphic soul and 
J:i&ctrine of the heart as source of life are found side by s ide in the De 
'G�rleratione An imalium (=DG�), a work whic h Nuyens dates with 01\. i.n the latest 
period of A. 's development. 
This evidence from DGA and the passage from M Zeta were both incorporated 
in w. F. R. Hardie's artic le on "Aristotle's Treatment of the Re lation Between 
the Soul and the Body , " published in 1964 (Philosophical Quarterly 14, 53-72) 
but written some years earlier. Hard ie uses the.in effectively against two 
propositions assumed by Nuyens , nainely, {l) that A. knew or bel ieved there was 
a contradiction between.the "entel echy view" and the "heart view" of the soul, 
and (2) that he gave up the latter after developing the former. In support of 
his position Hardie also presents a l ong analysis of the passage in De Motu 
Animalium {=DMA}on the origin of movement in animals (699al4-b7, 702a21-bll), 
showing it cons istent with the cryptic description of the same in DA III, 433b2 1-29, 
a consistency acknowledged by Ross in his commentary on DA (p. 317}:°" Hardie 
finds evidence of the hylomorphic view, too, in Q� I, DSen, and De Memoria (=DMem), 
all regarded by Ross as written before A. adopted the entelechy view. Thus Hardie 
succeeds in establishing that "Aristotle finds no inconsistency between the hylo­
morphic doctrine and local ization in the heart" (p. 67) and in detecting incon­
sistencies in the position of Nuyens and Ross. However, his attempt to go beyond 
this, to show that the two doctrines complement each other (p. 67 ff.), is , 
I believe, only partially successful . 
While Nuyens' position, in During' s judgment , could be cons idered the pre­
vailing view in 1968, these critiques were having their effect. That same year 
saw the appearance of G. E. R. Lloyd's Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His 
Thought {Cambridge , Engl.) in which Lloyd re.marks of Nuyens' posit ion on the 
" entelechy view "  vs. the "heart view" (p. 25): " • • .  scho lars such as Block and 
Hardie have shown • • .  that whatever we may think of the relationship between the 
two doctrines in question , Aristotle himself was unaware of any incompatibility 
between them." Two years later , in 1970, R.-A. Gauthier published the revision 
of his introduction to Aristote : L'Ethique � N icomaque (2nd ed., I, 1, I..ouvain), 
retaining Nuyen s ' chronology and deal ing brie fly with these critiques (46-47, 
n. 113). His effectivenes s , and theirs, is evaluated thus by Jonathan Barnes in 
his review in AGP 55, 1973, 80: "The distinction between Instrumentism and Hyle­
morphism, which forms the core of Nuyens' position, has been demolished by 
Block • • .  and by Hardie • • • .  Gauthier discusses Block's and Hardie's criticisms • • •  
but fails to appreciate their direction and their force . "  
If we accept Barnes' opinion that the core of Nuyens ' position "has been 
demolished by Block and by Harcfre," what more rema ins to be done? Have their 
discussions settled the problem, leaving room for nothing but autopsy? Perhaps 
not. These studies have presented compelling evidence that the "entelechy view" 
and the "heart view" of the soul, though regarded as incompatible by Nuyens and 
by Ross (see his PN, 7-12), apparently presented no incompatibility to A.'s mind 
since they appear"""together in the same context and the same works. This is enough, 
of course, to demolish the core of Nuyens' pos it ion and the basis for his chrono­
logical d istr ibution of A. 's wr itings . But it leaves us with the problem which 
troubled Nuyens in the first place, to which he offered his developmental or 
chronological solution. There does seem to be something incompatible between 
the notion of the soul as entelechy of the whole body (so that every organ, to 
be alive, must be " ensouled " ) and statements that the soul is "in the heart" 
(e.g., De Juventute=DJuv 469a5-7) and that " there is no need of soul in each part" 
� 
�� 
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as long as it "is present in some ruling center of the body" (DMA 703a36-37). 
If A. did not regard these as incompatible, how would he reconcile them? What 
relationship would he see between them? How are they compatible in his terms? 
Block has argued that the notion of the soul present in the whole body is 
logically compatible with the notion of the soul centered in one part, using as 
illustration the light in an electric bulb and in its filament (52-53). Hardie 
deals helpfully with the passage from DMA 702a21 ff. but backs away from the 
troublesome statement just quoted (703a36-37) with the warning that we should not 
press it too hard (p. 60). Brief but valuable suggestions on how A. might relate 
the two doctrines appear in Paul Siwek's introduction to his De Anima (Rome, 1965, 
18-19) and in H. J. Easterling's "Note on de Anima 413a8-9" (Phronesis 11, 1966, 
161-62). But of those I know, the longest and most helpful contribution in this 
direction is Charles Kahn's study of "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's 
Psychology" published in AGP (48. 1, 43-81) in 1966. 
Kahn's study is concerned specifically with the relationship of the psychic 
to the physical aspects of sensation in Aristotle and in contemporary psychology. 
The greater part of the study (46-70), devoted to a comprehensive review of A.'s 
sense psychology in his terms, establishes that A.'s "sensory soul" comprises a 
single psychological system in which the functions of the special senses are inte­
grated by the sensus communis, identical under other aspects with the faculty pro­
ducing sense of time, images, memories, sleep and dreams. But the "sensory soul", 
in A.'s terms, must inform, and function physiologically through, an appropriate 
organic system which, for A., can only be the organs of the special senses in con­
nection with the organ of the sensus communis, the heart. Reflecting on the impli­
cations of A.'s description of the "sensory soul" and its functions as presented in 
DA, Kahn shows that they require the physiological system eventually presented in 
the PN, so that the discussion of sensation and the "sensory soul" begun in the DA 
is continued, and not contradicted, by that of the PN (67-68). Why, then, is the­
sensus communis treated so sketchily and the heart hardly mentioned in DA? Kahn 
maintains (vs. Block II) that the reason is methodological, not chronological. 
The De Anima takes up a somewhat different point of view, since it ab­
stracts from all consideration of physiological detail. But there is 
really no reason to suppose that the physiological model.in Aristotle's 
mind, which he systematically refrains from introducing into the � 
Anima, is in any way different from that which is actually expounded 
by him in the other works (68-69). 
' 
Kahn's study, I believe, represents a long step toward a solution of the prob­
lem raised by Nuyens. Following his lead, I shall atte.mpt to develop further some 
of the considerations proposed there, and shall assume as valid his demonstration 
that A.'s discussion of the "sensory soul" and its organs in the PN is continuous, 
progressive, and in essential agreement with the doctrine proposed in general terms 
in DA. Any errors or imperfections in the attempt, of course, will be my own. 
The Heart in the De Anima 
First of all� to confirm and go beyond the position modestly stated in Kahn's 
last sentence quoted above, I suggest that we find very good reason indeed to believe 
the physiological model in A.'s mind in DA is substantially the same as that actually 
expounded by him in the PN and other works if we examine carefully the references to 
the heart in DA, few and'°""Incidental though they be, in conjunction with other prin­
ciples and remarks appearing in that same work. Elsewhere Kahn has suggested that 
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"these passages are revealing enough . • •  the heart in need of breath and the rational 
or sensitive soul operating in the chest can hardly reflect anything but Aristotle's 
own biology" (64-65, n. 50). This seems important enough to elaborate, especially 
in v iew of the fact that Ross considered A. 's relative silence on the heart in DA 
a sign that he had abandoned the psychophysiology of the biological works (PN, 7-8, 12). 
Distinguishing it from the hylomorphism of DA, Ross characterizes the view of 
the biological works as follows (PN 6): "In thisphase of Aristotle's thought, soul 
is thought of as closely associated with heat, and with the hottest organ in the 
body, the heart." Ross then cites as typical of the "heart view" selections from 
the De Partibus Animalium (=DPA) where A. asserts that the soul, while itself not 
fire, uses heat as a most apt instrument in its operations , specifically nutrition 
and the imparting of motion (652b7-16); that the heart is the center of life and of 
vital heat (653b5-6), the source of motion and sensation (665al0-13) essential to 
all animals {678bl-4). However, I believe it can be shown that these same functions 
are attributed to vital heat and to the heart in the DA also, where the "entelechy 
view" is proposed in detail . 
Turning then to DA, Book II ( " • . •  in all probability the latest of Aristotle's 
writings on psychologY": Ross, PN 17), we might consider first the passage where A. 
denies that "the nature of fire-;;-is the cause, without qualification , of nutrition 
and growth, but asserts that: "A co-cause, in a sense, it certainly is; but not the 
cause absolutely; that is rather the soul" (416al3-15). Shortly thereafter he ex­
plains (416b20 ff.) that in nutrition (1) it is the body that is nourished, (2) the 
"nutritive soul" that nourishes, (3) while that Ex_ which the body is nourished must 
be understood to include (a) the food, which must be concocted (i.e. changed with­
out changing another, like a ship's rudder) and (b) the vital heat, which effects 
concoction (i.e., is moved by the soul and itself changes the food, like the helms­
man's hand on the rudder , -- implying that the soul1 like the helmsman, effects 
change while remaining unchanged: see Hicks 348-49). Clearly, then, in DA as in 
the biological works, the soul is closely associated with the vital heat-;-using it 
as co-cause or primary instrument to effect nutrition and growth. And the same 
passage (416b9 ff.) explains how indispensible an instrument heat is to soul; for 
that which is ensouled or alive is said to preserve its substance only as long as 
it is nourished (416bl4-15}, but "all nourishment must be able to be digested; and 
what produces digestion is heat; therefore everything that is ensouled possesses 
heat" (416b28-29). 
This principle must apply not only to the organism as a whole but to each part 
of the organism, since all living parts need nourishment. However, A. indicates 
also in DA II that he is not thinking of all parts of the animal body as possessing 
heat in equal degree, but rather that the heart is "the hottest organ of the body," 
i.e., the center of vital heat, as in the biological works. For in DA II, while 
explaining that nature uses breath as a necessary means of regulating-the internal 
heat of the body (420b20-21), A. mentions, incidentally but explicitly, that the 
area which needs cooling before all others is the one surrounding the heart (420b 
25-26). This is perfectly consistent with his detailed description of heat distri­
bution in the body at DJuv 469b6 ff.: "Now in animals all the parts and the body 
as a whole contain a certain natural innate heat • • • •  And the source of this heat in 
blooded animals must be in the heart • • •  " 
Ross himself, in his commentary on DA 416b25-29 and 420b21 ff. (231-32, 252), 
refers to this and other passages from the last two treatises of the PN for A.'s 
full explanation of the physiological functions of the vital heat centered in the 
heart. It appears, then, that even in DA II, where he sets out the "entelechy view" 
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of the soul, A. is also thinking of it as "closely associated with heat, and with 
the hottest organ of the body, the heart." 
The passages from DPA which Ross cites as typical of A.'s thinking in the bio­
logical works indicate a further close connection between the heart as center of 
vital heat and as source of sensation and movement in animals. In his 1957 edition 
of � Ross states simply (p. 12) : "In the De Anima no such significance is attri­
buted to the heart • • •  " This judgment is qualified, however, in his 1961 edition of 
DA (p. 10): "In contrast with the importance attached to the heart in the biological 
works and the Parva Naturalia, in none of the four passages in which the heart is 
mentioned in the De Anima is any primary importance attached to it, although in 403a 
31, 408b8, and 432b31 it is still treated as the seat of anger and fear." 
It is t:i:ue that in these passages in DA the heart is "mentioned only incident­
ally and in other connections," as Ross remarks elsewhere (PN 12). But this does 
not necessarily mean that in none of them "is any primary importance attached to it" 
(DA 10). The incidental references may be more revealing for what they assume or 
imply, as in the case of the first at 420b25-26 indicating the heart as center of 
the vital heat necessary to the basic functions of nutrition and growth. In the 
other three references mentioned by Ross we find the heart invariably singled out 
as the specific organ in which psychic states are immediately manifested in the 
body. When considering these one should bear in mind a principle upon which A. in­
sists in the DA, namely, that the existence of one sense power in part of an animal, 
even the lowest, implies the coexistence of others in the same part: "If there is 
sense perception, there is also imagination and appetite; for where sense percep­
tion exists there is also pleasure and pain, and where these, desire necessarily 
exists" (413b22-24; and see 414bl-6). "Speaking generally, then, in as much as an 
animal is capable of appetite it is also capable of self-movement; but it is not 
capable of appetite without imagination, and all imagination involves either calcu­
lation or sensation" (433b27-29; and see 433b31-434a7). The same principle is re­
stated in De Somno (=DSom) 454b29-31, which goes on to attribute these conscious 
activities"i:o the central sense faculty whose organ is the heart. 
Of the three mentioned by Ross we might consider first the reference at 408b8, 
which occurs in a context recognized by Nuyens as hylemorphique (186). Aristotle 
here (408bl-19) is emphasizing the bodily aspect of psychic states, the aspect 
which, he says, is often overlooked when we speak of the soul as being pained, 
pleased, bold, fearful, etc. Each of these states is a movement (which implies 
matter) having its origin in the soul. "For example, to be angry or to fear is 
for the heart to be changed (moved) in this way or that, and to reason ( 51.a• 
vo&1o0a.1. ) involves this organ or some other" (408b7-9; or "that the heart be 
changed in a similar way or some other": Ox. transl.; Hicks 274 ad b9). The nature 
and manner of the change in the heart is not specified. Thus far-408bl-ll. The 
point is, A. continues, that to say the soul is moved or changed, e.g., feels 
anger, is like saying it weaves or buildS:--It is better not to speak of the soul 
as feeling angry but rather to say that the composite, the man, does so, under­
standing �hat- the. ·change: involved·'in sensation and' emotion do�-� not_.:occur iri the 
soul but reaches to the soul or starts from it (bll-18). 
The latter part of this passage (bll-18) is employed some seventeen times by 
Nuyens as illustrative of the hylomorphic theory, and properly so. But he never 
cites or comments on the first half (bl-11) in which the heart is specified as the 
organ immediately involved in the movements of anger, fear, and reasoning. 
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It is perhaps surprising to find "reasoning" ( 51.avoetaea1.) linked to a 
change in the heart. Yet, in a continuation of this passage, A. again links "rea­
soning" with emotions (love and hate) as dependent upon a certain physical organ 
which somehow "possesses" the thinking soul (408b27); in which the soul is present 
(b23); an interior organ (b25) whose disturbance by drunkeness, disease, or old age 
impairs the rational processes (b22-25); upon which memory too is dependent (27-28). 
I follow the interpretation of Ross (DA 198-99 ad 408b25) that A. here attributes 
the loss of the capacity to reason, remember, love, etc. to the disability of a 
particular internal organ. Ross identifies it: 
We should say 'the brain', A. would say 'the heart', which at this stage 
of his thinking he treats as the seat of anger and fear (403a31, 408b8, 
432b31). In De Sensu 456a4 and in De Iuv. 478a29 he treats it as the 
ultimate seat-;f all psychical events; but it plays a much less prominent 
part in De Anima. 
If this interpretation is sound, we have here an important but implicit refer­
ence to the heart-sensorium not generally recognized. (See, e.g., Kahn, p. 65, note 
50.) Ross, realizing its significance, quite consistently refuses to include DA I 
among the works of A.'s "hylomorphic" period (PN 16-17; cf. Hardie 66-68). 
The connection between the reasoning faculty and the emotions leading to pur­
suit or avoidance is taken up again (as Hicks indicates, 274 ad 408b9) in IA III. 7. 
Having introduced the doctrine of the sensus communis (426bl2""f°f.) and the--,,-ultimate" 
sensorium through which it operates (426bl6), and having described the image-produc­
ing faculty (427bl2 ff.) and the thinking mind in man {429al0 ff.), A. here returns 
to the connection between thought and action and finds them linked through images 
produced by the central, the "ultimate" sense (43lal4-20). Where is the organ of 
this "ultimate" sense? A.'s discussion of touch and taste in� II, 422bl7 ff. makes 
it clear that for them it is not the outer flesh but some interior organ. Ross 
again, commenting on this (DA 262-63, 265 ad 423al5-16, b23), suggests that A. has 
the doctrine of DSen 439al-�in mind, where--the conunon organ of touch and taste is 
said to be "near" or "closely related to" the heart. The full implication appears, 
however, in DJuv 469al0-16 where A. argues to the location of the common sensorium 
on the ground that "we see clearly that two senses, touch and taste, extend to the 
heart, so that the others must also" (al2-14). Consequently we should recognize 
another implicit reference to the heart in DA II at 423b23 where A. refers to the 
common sensorium "within". He must have thesame in mind when he speaks of the 
"ultimate" organ of sense later in DA III at 426bl6 and 43lal8. 
In DA III.7 A. explains that the faculty of pursuit and avoidance, pleasure 
and pain, -rs rationally distinct from but really identical with the faculty of sense 
perception (43lal0-14) which also produces the images necessary to and concomitant 
with the operation of the thinking faculty (43lb2-5). Having established this, he 
is ready to discuss the origin of motion in man and animals (432al5 ff.). In explor­
ing this problem A. again refers to the heart. 
First, the heart is explicitly mentioned as the physical organ affected by the 
image of something painful or pleasant: "When the mind contemplates some such object, 
it does not immediately order avoidance or pursuit. For example it often thinks 
about something frightful or pleasant, but does not bid one be frightened, though 
the heart is moved or, if the object be pleasant, some other part" (432b29-433al). 
The heart, as organ of the central sense and image-making faculty, is the first 
organ to react to the image of a painful or pleasant object though the mind may nQt 
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sanction its reaction, in which other organs may also be involved. 
secondly, the psychophysiology suggested here helps to elucidate the cryptic 
passage toward the .end of this discussion (433bl9-27) where A. speaks of the "bodily 
part" which the appetitive faculty uses as its organ to move the animal. This 
organ is found "at a point where beginning and end coincide." "For everything is 
moved by pushing and pulling, so that something must remain fixed, like the center 
point of a moving circle, from which motion has its origin." Ross, with most conunen­
tators (see Hicks 565 ad 433b26), identifies the organ in question as the heart, 
"which is for A. the central seat of life," and refers the reader to DPA 665al0 and 
OMA 698bl-4 (DA 317 ad 21-27, 25-27). These passages certainly provide clarification. 
But early in DA itself A. has already indicated something of the basic dynamics of 
emotion and the origin of movement in the heart; and this will find further elucida­
tion at the end of the PN. 
As we have seen, � II 420b25-26 indicates that A. is thinking of the heart 
as the "hottest organ of the body,11 the center of vital heat so necessary to nutri­
tion and growth. How this function as center of the thermal system enables the heart 
to operate also as center of emotional response and movement is suggested by the 
first explicit reference to the heart in the DA, that at 403a31. In the context A. 
is bent on establishing that most psychic events involve the body, with the possible 
exception of human thought(403a5-8). Examples are 11anger, confidence, desire, and 
sensation in general" (403a7) and, again, "anger, gentleness, fear, pity, confidence, 
joy, loving and hating" (al?-18). To illustrate A. turns to a favorite pair of 
opposites, anger and fear, appealing to the common experience that we sometimes feel 
these emotions when there is little or no stimulus, while at other times we do not 
feel them though the stimulus is great {bl9-25). Consequently these are to be con­
ceived as A6yo� ivoAo�, and any adequate definition should include both their formal 
and material aspect (a24ff.). Taking anger as an example, A. explains that its 
formal aspect might be defined as "an urge to inflict pain in retaliation," while 
its material aspect would be "a boiling ( �&en.<; ) of the blood around the heart" 
(a25-31). This suggests that the physical manifestation of anger arises from a more 
than normal increase of vital heat in the heart, causing the blood to "boil". 
Now anger and fear are linked as opposites in this passage and elsewhere 
(DA 403bl8, 408b8; and cf. DM 453a26-28; DPA 650b27 ff., 667al6-23, 692a22-26; Rhet. 
1380a33, etc.) and have different bodily manifestations (403al9-26). If anger­
reaction is started as an increase of vital heat in the heart, then presumably fear­
reaction begins as a decrease in its normal heat, causing the blood there and else­
where to cool. This ties in precisely with the detailed physiology of De Respiratione 
(=D'Jtes) 479bl7-480al6, where A. distinguishes "palpitation" of the heart from "pulsa­
tion" :palpitation is a contraction of heat in the heart caused by a cooling down 
(479bl9-20); in a state of fear the body grows cold and the heat, contracted and 
concentrated in the heart, makes it palpitate, sometimes so violently that the organ­
ism dies of fright (b21-26). Pulsation, the opposite, an expansion due to an increase 
of hea:t;,\, "is like boiling ( �&aa..<;; ) • For boiling occurs when liquid is vaporized 
by heat and expands because its bulk increases11 (b30-32). This must be the "boil­
ing" of the blood A. has in mind at DA 403a31 as the physical dimension of anger. 
And this contraction and expansion through decrease or increase of the normal temp­
erature at the heart accounts for the "pushing and pulling" communicated from the 
central organ in A.'s description of the origin of movement at DA 434b25. (For the 
mechanics involved see Pseudo-A., Mechanica 847bl6 ff.) It is basic to the more 
comprehensive description in� 698al4 ff. and elsewhere. 
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Finally, one type of complex animal movement, voice production, is traced 
specifically to the region of the heart, pharynx and lungs in DA II (420b27-33) 
inunediately after A. has indicated the heart as the "hottest organ of the body" 
(b25-26). In discussing sound and voice, A. asserts that nature uses breath in­
spired through the pharynx to the lung for two purposes, refrigeration and voice 
production. Refrigeration is needed most at the heart (25-26). And voice is a 
striking of breathed-in air against the windpipe "under the influence of soul in 
these parts" (b28). A. explains inunediately what he intends by this last phrase 
since it constitutes the specific difference of "voice": "For not every sound pro­
duced by an animal is voice • • •  since it is possible to make a sound just with the 
tongue or like coughing; but the sound-impact must be ensouled, i.e., its pro­
duction accompanied by an act of the image-making faculty. For voice is the kind 
of sound that conveys meaning" (b29-33: O'Y)µ.av-i;vx�c; 'ljr6cpoc; )
. The "meaning" under-
stood here is of the most elemental type, shared with other animals by man, who 
also has the higher power of speech. "Voice is a sign ( O'Y)µe'tov ) of pain and 
pleasure, and for this reason is possessed also by other animals, for their nature 
is developed to this point that they have sensations of pain and pleasure and sig­
nal ( O'Y)µ.aCve�v) these to one another" (Politics 1253all-14). clearly implied, 
then, is that the "soul in these parts" functions in sense perception, imagination, 
emotion or pleasure-pain reaction, and the communication of emotion through pro­
duction of appropriate sound, implying control of breath and bodily organs. These 
are obviously activities of the "sensitive soul" integrated in the common sensorium, 
the heart. The anatomy, physiology, and teleology of this is detailed in DPA 
(664a37 ff., esp. 665a7-26), while DGA states clearly that the heart is the source 
of voice (776bl8) and explains differences in male and female voice quality by rela­
tive taughtness or slackness of the heart (787bl5-788al6). 
Thus the explicit and implicit references to the heart in DA, though relatively 
few and introduced incidentally, indicate clearly enough that A.-.ts thinking of the 
heart even in this work as the central organ of the nutritive and sensitive life, a 
doctrine he develops explicitly and in detail in the PN and the biological works. 
Even in DA II, where he introduces the definition of soul as entelechy of the body, 
he also thinks of soul as being present and operating on the nutritive and sensitive 
levels "in these parts", i.e., in the heart and surrounding organs. These notions 
which to Nuyens and Ross seemed incompatible evidently were not so for A. 
What then was the relationship between the two notions for A.? I believe a 
case can be made for the position that A. not only thought of them as compatible but 
even as joined by necessity, that his presuppositions about the soul and his concep­
tion of soul as described in DA II made it necessary, in his eyes, to postulate a 
single dominant organ in whic�the soul functions primarily in animals and man. 
This is the antithesis of the position of Nuyens. Kahn has argued to such a necessity 
for the "sensible soul" (67-68). There seems to be no reason why the same should not 
be true for the animal soul as a whole. 
� Necessity of the Heart � Center in Hylomorphism 
First let us look at the characteristics of the hylomorphic soul and the con­
dition of its existence as A. preseni> them in the DA. After a brief introduction on 
the value and difficulty of his subject (402al-403a2) A. opens the DA with the first 
of what Richard Sorabji has called his "two main theoretical statements" ("Body and 
Soul in Ar,tistotle," Philosophy 49, 1974, 77). This is the passage we have already 
examined (403a3-bl9) in which A. introduces his fundamental position that no function 
or affection of soul (with the possible exception of pure thought) exists independently 
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of a concurrent physical change. we may distinguish rationally the formal essence 
from the physical manifestation of anger, for example; but the two are joined in the 
real event. The form or essence must be embodied in appropriate matter ( lv lSA.'Q 't"01..q.6t> 
to exist (403b2-3); and for the truth both must be taken into account, since emotions 
like anger and fear "are inseparable from the animal's physical body in which they 
take place" (bl7-18}. A.'s view from the start is obviously hylomorphic, with 
emphasis here on the need for matter, and appropriate matter, if the form is to exist. 
Sorabji locates A.'s second "main theoretical statement" at the end of DA II 
"where it rounds off the discussion of the five senses" (424b3-18: Sorabji 77-;-but 
better 424al7-bl8). Here A. is concerned not with perceptive or emotional activities 
but with their faculties. Again he distinguishes rationally the sense faculty from 
the sense organ in which it exists. But in reality "they exist as one and the same 
thing, though they differ in essence. For that which senses must have extension; 
but neither the having power to sense nor the sense faculty is something extended; 
they are rather a certain A.6yoc;; or power of something extended" (424a25-28). Here 
A. stresses the immateriality of the faculty as form. But both principles join .to 
constitute the living reality and both are equally necessary. These two passages 
catch the basic hylomorphic view of body and soul and should be kept in mind through 
the intervening discussion which they frame (Sorabji 77). 
Following the first of these statements at the opening of DA I A. presents a 
critical account of earlier theories on soul. Ross has remarked (DA 12) that A.'s 
own views about the soul "are largely shaped by his sense of the objections to which 
earlier views were exposed." That being the case, the account of his predecessors 
becomes important as an index of the errors A. is trying to avoid and as a formula­
tion of the presuppositions which help to shape his own definition and description 
of the soul. Some of A.'s negative reactions to previous theories of soul are as 
follows: 
1. Soul is not material, i.e. an element like fire or air or any combination of 
them: 403b28 ff.; nor is it a spatial magnitude (vs. Plato): 407a3-33. 
2. Soul is not joined to body unnaturally or painfully: 407bl-4; but body and soul 
must be of a special nature so as to join connaturally; it is absurd to think 
any chance soul could be joined to any body; each body must have form and shape 
suitable to the soul it serves as instrument (vs. Plato ? , Pythagorea.ns): 
407bl3-25. 
3: On the other hand soul is not simply the harmony, ratio, or blend of the oppos­
ing constituents of the body; one reason, among many, is that it has the power 
to originate motion: 407b26 ff. 
4. Soul does not move body by moving itself; rather, while not itself moving, it 
is moved only indirectly by reason of the body, its vehicle, like a sailor on a 
ship: 405b31-407a2, 408a30-33; when soul is said to change, as in emotion, it 
is the physical organ (the peart) that changes locally or qualitatively; not the 
soul but the composite changes; movement is from the soul and to the soul; de­
cline of mind in old age is due to deterioration of the interior organ on which 
it depends; soul is not changed, nor changes itself: 408bl-32. (Hylomorphism) 
5. Souls are not all of the same kind, e•g. not all that have sense perception (ani­
mals) can originate local motion; plants have soul but cannot perceive or move 
locally; and many animals are without power of reason: 410bl6-27. 
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6. The soul is not divided into a multiplicity of really distinct parts each 
serving a separate function, e.g. perception and knowing, appetition, local 
motion , etc., or one part thinking, another desiring (Plato?); so the soul is 
one: 4lla26-bl4. 
7. Parts of the soul do not hold together parts of the body, but rather the whole 
soul with all its parts is present in each part of the body , though in plants 
and some insects the whole soul can be divided , since these organisms can be 
divided into living segments of the same species ; but they do not survive if 
in them the soul does not possess organs suitable to preserve their nature: 
4llbl5-30. 
Some of A.1s presuppositions, then, are that the soul is single with multiple 
powers, immaterial but existing only in a connatural material body equipped with 
organs suitable to the various functions of soul, and to this particular type of 
soul, there being many. Soul does not change but is the source of change in the 
ensouled organism. Within the context of these presuppositions A. undertakes his 
own positive definition of soul in DA II. There is no need to rehearse his develop­
ment of the definition of soul as the substantial form, entelechy or actuality, and 
first actuality , of a natural body having life potentially (412al-29). This aspect, 
especially the notion of soul as entelech� of the entire body, receives close 
attention from Nuyens (66 ffo; 238 ff.) and Ross (DA 10 ff.), and quite properly . 
But there is little to be found in the commentatorS-and , for that matter, in the DA 
itself, about that part of the definition describing the kind of body the soul can 
inform and activate. 
It is identified first as "a natural body having life potentially " (412a28). 
A.innnediately specifies this as "a natural body equipped with organs," and hastens 
to point out that the definition applies to plants since they also have organs. In 
contrast to an artifact, e.g. an axe, it must be "a natural body of a particular 
kind, viz. one having in itself a principle or source ( d.pxfl ) of its motion or rest" 
(412bl6-17; cf. Physics 192b4-23). Later , after distinguishing the various powers 
of soul in plants, animals, and man, A. reinforces the point that each kind of soul 
can exist only in a body proper to it, since " the actuality of any given thing can 
only be realized • . •  in a matter of its own appropriate to it li (414a25-27). But A. 
has not much more to say directly about the body beyond these generalizations in.DA. 
Nor should we expect him to go beyond this in a work on the soul, though we have 
seen in his incidental references to the heart in DA that he thinks of the heart as 
the central organ, in man and other blooded animals. But A. could not properly dis­
cuss the appropriateness of this body, or the bodily structure demanded by any soul, 
until he had first presented a more comprehensive account of the varieties and 
functions of soul, the soul as efficient and final as well as formal cause of the 
organism , the soul ' s nutritive, sensitive, locomotive, and intellectual faculties 
and their objects, which is what he does in the remainder of DA, and continues to 
do through the early treatises of the PN, as Kahn has shown. 
We must turn then to other works which obviously share with � the hylomorphic 
view of soul. Both Nuyens (e.g. 176-77) and Ross (DA 11) regard the Metaphysics as 
closely related to DA in this respect. There the n;;; familiar passage at Zeta 
1035bl4 ff. is instructive. Discussing the relation of parts to the whole, A. des­
cribes soul in hylomorphic terms as the "form or essence of a body of a certain 
kind" (bl6) and explains that the soul and its parts, as essential substance, are 
prior to the animal and to the body and its parts; though in a sense they are not, 
since they cannot exist apart from the concrete whole, the composite of body and soul. 
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Thr:!n, speaking of the relationship of parts of the composite to the whole, he goes 
on to remark without qualification: "Some parts are neither prior nor posteri or to 
the composite, namely , those which are controlling (xop1.a ) and in which the formula, 
i.;·• the essential substance (o X6yo� xat � o&a�a } is primarily present (iv ; 
nP<AYt'Ct> ) , e.g., the heart, or perhaps the brain,-- for it does not matter which of the 
two is of such a natu re" (b25-28}. 
Here, as has been re.marked, A. speak� of the hylomorphic soul as being "present 
in" some particular controlling organ (at the moment he is not interested in taking 
sides on whether this be heart or brain; see below) . The soul is present in this 
controlling organ primarily. And the organ is one that is not prior or posterior to 
the composite but comes into existenc e simultaneously ( �µ.a) with it. The context 
of A.'s thought is cla rified by a related passage in M Delta where, in listing 
various meanings of the word apxfl ( source, beginning) -he mentions in third place 
"that thing as a result of whose presence something first comes into being, e.g., as 
the keel is the beginning of a ship, the foundation the beginning of a house, and in 
the case of animals some say the heart, others the brain, others something similar • • •  " 
(1013a4-6). 
Though these passages do not commit A. to either the heart or the brain, they 
certainly make it clear that he conceives the hylomorphic soul as present in, form­
ing and informing, some one principal or controlling organ first in the generation 
of the animal . And the moment that organ is formed marks the beginning of the ani­
mal, the composite. For the rest of the animal is formed from this organ and around 
it as its beginning and source. 
The necessity, as well as the dynamics, of this process is brought out force­
f ully in DGA, a work which Nuyens regards as hylemorphique (256-263}. The hylomorphic 
soul of DA cannot exist except as formal cause informing an appropriate organ or 
system o�organs; it is also the efficient cause, the source of change and motion, 
which forms apd functions in the composite; and it is the final cause for the sake 
of whose functions the complete organism, the End, is developed and maintained. 
Accordingly, in DGA 735b34 ff. A. explains that to initiate the independent life of 
a new animal theSoul must form a single primary organ from the residue of seed, which 
ensouled organ becomes the source of all other organs subsequently formed (742a33-b3): 
"First of all it is necessary (ttvayxa'tov ) that some part exist in which the source 
of motion is present (since of course this is a part of the End, being single and 
all-controlling, iv xat xup1,.&,;a�ov ) ; and then after this the whole organism, i.e., 
the End • • .  So that if there is some such part -- which must (ttvayxatov) be present 
in animals, one which possesses the principle (apx�) and the End of the animal's 
whole nature -- it is necessa ry (ttvayxa!ov ) that this be formed first (np(;yc-ov ) � 
instrument of change (x1.vT)'t"1.x6v} but simultaneously with the whole organism� 
part of the End." 
The implications are no doubt clear. The soul must form, inform and activate 
a single controlling organ from the start, by means of which it produces the natural 
growth of the other organs necessary for the functioning of all its powers or facul­
ties . This organ is not only chronologically first in generation but also the domi­
nant or controlling organ in the fully-formed animal, since it must continue to do its 
work as primary control center of the life processes if the organism is to continue 
to be nourished, refreshed by sleep, etc. so as to maintain itself. Hence the soul 
is present in this organ primarily and as controlling the other organs through it. 
This is not to deny that the soul also forms, informs and activates and so is 
present in -- the other organs necessary to all its functions. But it can do this 
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only because it is present first in one organ formed to serve as origin and control 
center ( dpxTi> of the other organs. Thus soul is present in all the organs of the 
body, but not in the same way. It must be, and continue to be, present in one 
organ n� xat xop�OO<;. Yet this organ, like any other, lives and functions 
only as part of a living whole. Perhaps it is this A. has in mind at DA II 412bl6-
l 7 where he de�cribes the body appropriate for the hylomorphic soul as-;;-a natural 
body of a particular kind, viz. one having in itself a principle or source ( apxfi ) 
of its motion and rest." Of course the soul must always be the ultimate source of 
motion and rest; but it can only exist as incorporated in an appropriate organ. 
DGA leaves no doubt about which organ this is (e.g. 74lbl6-17): "The first to 
be formed is the source ( dpxfi>, which in blooded animals is the heart • • •  " A. estab­
lishes the heart (vs. those who favor the brain) as the primary organ on the basis 
of several considerations: The heart is observed to be the first formed in the 
embryo; it is the center of the vascular system from which nourishment (blood) is 
pumped to the other organs; it is the center of vital heat necessary for the nutri­
tive and formative (see 740b30-74la3) processes; it is located in the place of com­
mand at the geometrical center of the organism. In lower animals it is an organ 
analogous to the heart. And even plants grow out symmetrically from some part formed 
as an &pxfi {DGA 762bl8-21). 
We have been concerned with the processes of formation, nutrition, and growth, 
--all functions of the "nutritive soul" which, as we have seen, necessarily informs 
a primary organ, the heart, as source and control center of these processes in the 
developing and in the mature animal. But the distinguishing characteristic of an 
animal is the presence of a "sensitive soul". What necessity connects this with the 
"nutritive soul" and the heart? DGA is of little help here. 
As we have seen, the question of the distinction between the nutritive, sensi­
tive, and other "parts" of soul was settled at the end of DA I in favor of one soul 
with a number of rationally, not really, distinct facultieS:- The question arises 
again in DA II (413bl3-32) and at the end of DA III (432a22 ff.) and reaches the same 
conclusion: Aside from pure intellect, "the remaining parts of the soul. • •  are not 
separable in the way that some allege them to be; at the same time it is clear that 
they are logically distinct" (413b27�29). The statement asserting the real unity of 
soul is aimed, here as elsewhere, at the Platonic view 'of Timaeus 69 D ff. which 
divides the soul into three really distinct parts and assignes each to a particular 
area of the body (Hicks 327 ad 413b28). We have also seen that three of the explicit, 
and several implicit, refereru;-es to the heart in DA show that A. is thinking of it as 
the organ of the central sense power; while the fourth explicit reference points to 
the heart as center of the vital heat operative in nutrition and growth. Thus in the 
DA, though concerned with the formal and avoiding the material aspect of the organism, 
A. indicates incidentally that he is thinking of the single animal soul as embodied 
in a unified physiological system centered in the heart. This becomes explicit in the 
PN. 
Kahn has established by careful analysis of A.'s theory of sensation in DA and 
the first three treatises of the PN that "the De Anima and the Parva Naturaliaform 
a continuous and progressive exposition• (67) in which investigation of the indivi­
dual senses gives way to "ingressive exploration" of the sensus conununis until, in 
his explanation of sleep, "Aristotle's psychology meets his physiology" (59), i.e. 
the "unity of the entire sense faculty" is in De Somno (455al2-22) "for the first 
time linked to the physiological doctrine of the unity of the sense apparatus in the 
conunon sensorium, the heart • • •  " (ibid.). Later, rounding off this subject, Kahn 
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concludes that there is a necessary connection between A.'s sense psychology and 
his physiology (68) : 
For the sensory soul is, by definition, the form and realization of the 
sensory body; and the unity of one is unthinkable without the unity of 
t:he other. Far from contradicting the psychologica·1 doctrine of the De 
Anima, the physiology of the Parva Naturalia and of the biological works 
is required if the doctrine of sense perception as a single faculty of 
the soul is to be understood at all. The inference from unity of 
faculty to unity of physiological system is explicitly made by Aristotle 
himself in the Parts of Animals (667b21-31), where the fact that 'all 
animals possess a sensory soul which is actually one' is cited as a 
causal explanation for the unity of the vascular system in the heart. 
The conclusion is, I believe, inescapable. But though the principle may be 
validly extended to the whole animal soul, Kahn is concerned specifically with the 
"sensory soul", as is A. in the passage cited from DPA. Moreover, we are conunitted 
to showing that A. was himself aware of � necessi�of a unified physiological 
systein to serve the single animal soul. 
As Kahn points out, for the first time in the continuous discussion beginn­
ing with DA "Aristotle's psychology meets his physiology" explicitly in the DSom 
455al2-22-;here the common sensorium is identified as the heart. However, it."'"i'S 
essential to A.'s explanation of the phenomenon of sleep and waking that he also 
identify the heart here as center of the nutritive functions. For what specifies 
the "incapacity of the sense faculty" in sleep is that it is caused by thermal 
changes in the heart, center of the vital heat and of the vascular system. And 
these thermal changes are induced by the ingestion of food (456a30 ff.). Thus the 
functions of the "nutritive soul" closely affect those of the "sensitive soul" be­
cause both nutritive and sensory systems are united.in their common central organ, 
the heart. 
A. identifies the heart, then, as center of both systems in DSom; but he does 
not use the vocabulary of necessity which would reveal his conviction that the ani­
mal soul must be actualized in a body unified by the heart. This is reserved until 
he has completed his discussion of the "sensitive soul" and allied subjects in the 
first five treatises of the PN and has returned to consideration of topics related 
to the "nutritive soul" in the last three. 
These are so closely related that they constitute a continuous discussion (Hett, 
Loeb 388). The first treatise introduces the subject of the length and shortness of 
life, describing the ultimate physical constituents of various organisms and their 
role in determining the life-span of each. Following this, A. plans to explore in 
detail the subjects of youth, old age, death, and the related topic of respiration 
(467bl0-13). In preparation he discusses explicitly the relation of the "parts" of 
the animal soul to each other and to the body, referring to his treatment of soul 
in DA and connecting the notion of soul developed there with a body unified through 
a central controlling organ (467bl3-16) : "Since we have discussed the soul in precise 
detail in another treatise and it is clear that.its essential nature cannot be corporal, 
nevertheless it is also evident that soul is present in some particular bodily part, 
and this one of the parts having control over the rest." 
We have seen A. use the language of necessity in DGA in connecting the opera-
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tion of the "nutritive soul " to a single p rima ry organ. Here he emplo ys it again 
to establish the unity of the nut ritive and sensitive soul in a controll ing organ 
(bl8-23): 
Rega rding things that are said to be 'animals' and to be 'alive',--in 
those organ isms to which both these terms apply (viz. to be an animal and 
to be alive) it is necessa ry Cdvayx� ) that there be a single identical 
part in virtue of which the o rganism both 'lives' and is called an 'ani­
mal'. Fo r it is impossi ble for an 'an imal' qua 'animal' not to be al ive • • •  " 
An o rganism endowed with an animal ( "sens itive" ) soul must always possess the 
powe rs of the "nutritive" soul in virtue of which it lives (DA 414b28-415a2) . And 
the single soul with both nutritive and sensitive powers must operate through a 
single controlling organ. This o rgan, to be a suitable instrument for such a soul, 
"mt1st be numerically one and the same but have multiple and different modes of being, 
since to be 'animal ' and to be 'alive' are not identical" (467b25-27). 
A. Proceeds next (b27 ff.) to establish that this organ is the hea rt, on the 
basis that (1) the organ of the sensus communis and the source of the n ut ritive 
faculty would occupy a central position in the body; (2) the heart is observed to 
be formed first in the embryo; (3) the heart is the so urce of the blood vessels 
which carry nourishment (blood) to the rest of the body. "Ther efore it is necessary 
Cdvayx� ) that in blooded animals the source and control center Capxfl) of both the 
•sensitive' and the ' n utrit ive' soul be in the heart" (469a5-7) . The concl usion is 
further reinforced by observation that the central sense is located in the heart 
since the basic senses of touch and taste are traced to that organ (469al0-16): and 
by deduction from the principle that nat ure always works to achieve the best possi­
ble, and the central position is the be�t for control (a28-bl). A. closes the 
argument with the state ment (469b3-6): "Since therefore an animal is defined by the 
possession of a 'sensitive soul', in blooded animals it is necessary ( &.vayxa!ov ) 
that this have its sou rce and control center ( d.pxf)) in the heart ." 
What is the nature of the "necessity" which A. has in mind in these sta tements? 
Probably that which he explains in another context (DSom 455b26-28): "I use the term 
' necessity ' in its conditional sense, meaning that if an animal is to exist and have 
its own proper nature, by necessity certain things must belong to it; and if these 
are to belong to it, certain others must also belong to it." 
Following this direction, we might suppose his reasoni ng would proceed somewhat 
as follows: If the hylomorphic animal soul, being one with seye ral faculties, is to 
exi st, it must be realize d in an appropriate body. But this must be a "body equip­
ped with organs" in s uch a way that thP. one soul can carry on its complex functions 
in a unified and coo rdinate d manner. But this can only be done through a complex 
system of approp riate organs unified under a s ingle central and controlling organ 
through which the soul can operate as source of motion and rest in t he entire organ­
ism, integ rating and controlling the life functions on both the nutritive and sensi­
tive levels . But in blooded animals this must be the central and controlling organ 
of the vascul ar system and the sensory system , the hea rt . 
The best constructed animals , A. remarks (468bll-13), have a nature that is, as 
far as possible, one. Paul Siwek has seen that, unlike Plato's tripartitie soul , 
Aristotle's hylomorphic so ul can only incorporate its unity by forming, and informing, 
a body integrated about a single controlling organ (op. cit. 19): "Tune solummodo 
un itas entis vivi potest salvari." The same point was made several centuries ago by 
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,Jacoh Zaharella in his commentary on DA II {cap. II, 295 D) : 
Ad un itatem vero animalis servandam unum tantum praecipuum membrum 
est concedendum, in quo tota sit anima radicata et a quo tamquam 
princ ipio et fonte ad 0IT1nes corporis partes effundatur . • •  
Soul in the Heart and in the Body as a Whole ----- -------------
In the light of these considerations, how are we to deal with A.'s statements 
that the soul "is present in ( e!va.1. lv ) some particular part of the body" (� 467 
bl5), tha:t: some part of the body "possesses" the sensitive soul ( [xe1. a.o-rl)v : DMem 
450a29)' that the apxfl of the sensitive and nutritive soul is "in the heart" ( ev -qi 
xa.pqt<( : DJuv 469a6-7)? How can A. speak in these terms and at the same time conceive 
the soul as form or entelechy, the principle of life throughout the body? 
This is obviously the problem which led Nuyens to declare the "entelechy view" 
incompatible with the "heart view" and to propose his chronological solution. Kahn, 
discussing sensation only, suggests a more promising approach (69): "Since the sensory 
soul. • •  includes not only the general power of sensation but also the special faculties 
of external sense, it must be thought of as informing the entire sense apparatus, al­
though it does so from its source or foundation (arch@ )  in the heart. Thus there is 
a derivative psychic power residentin the eye • • •  " - --
Tf Kahn's statement were broadened to include the whole nutritive-sensory soul 
it could apply to the animal as a whole, thus: The soul must be thoughtof as inform­
ing the entire nutritive and sensory apparatus, i.e. all the organs of the body, but 
as doing �o from its source or foundation in the primary and first-formed organ of 
the body, the heart. The psychic power informing and maintaining the other organs 
is derivative in that it originated genetically in the heart, formed the other organs 
and preserves them in dependence on the heart, imparts change and movement to them 
from its center in the heart. 
To say that the soul has its source in the heart is · not to deny its presence in 
the rest of the body, but only to affirm that it is present in a different way in 
the heart and in the other organs. For the soul forms and activates the heart as 
the primary and controlling organ of the body, and so is present in the heart in a 
way different from it s Dresence in all secondary and subordinate organs, i.e.�it is 
present in the heart as
-
the control center of all functions carried out through the 
organic systems that constitute the body. Conceived in this way, some of f\.1s diffi­
cult statements about the presence of the soul "in the heart" are more easily und er­
standabl e . 
Nuyens and Ross find a contradiction between the notion of soul as form or en­
telechy of the whole body and soul as being present "in the heart" because they evi­
dently understand the latter expression to imply local presence in the strict sense. 
Thus Nuyens interprets the phrase as equivalent to "localis�e a une place definie" 
(259); and Ross takes it as meaning "being located in" (PN 12; DA 10). Understood 
in this way, the soul would "be located in" the heart as--;ine isin a jar, to use A.1s 
example (Physics 210a24 ff.). This, of course, would certainly preclude its being 
present in the same way at the same time in the rest of the body. 
However, as Sorabj i points out (85, note 62'), "the soul does not meet Aristotle1s 
requirements for ' being in a place'." (Cf. DA 406al2-16 and Physics 210b32 ff.) To 
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A. "being in place" implies matter and extension, as does moving from place to Ple1.ce. 
The soul, therefore, being incorporeal, can no more "be in place", of itself, than it 
can move locally, of itsAlf (DA 405b32 ff.}. A. can hardly h�ve intended, then, that 
the irnmr.tterial soul be understood to be "in the heart" locally. He must have in mind 
some other mode of "being in" that organ. 
As a preliminary ro his c:Uscussion of space in the Physics, A. enumera t e s  eight 
different senses in which one thing is said to "be in" another (210al4-24}. The last, 
signifying localization in the strict sense, is inapplicable to soul and heart, as 
are the first four, which involve the relationship of part to whole and genus to 
species. The fifth concerns the relationship between form and matter, since the form 
is said to "be in" the matter of the compound. Perhaps A. speaks of the soul "in the 
heart" in this sense. 
A. certainly affirms that the soul is "in" a body as its form or entelechy. He, 
agrees with those who think that the soul cannot ex'I'S't'""without a body, though itself 
not body: "For it is not a body, but something belonging to a body, and for this 
reason is present in a body" Clv o&>µa't't. unapx&1.: DA 414a21-23}. But then A. goes on 
to insist that this must be "a body of a particular kind; not at all as our pre­
decessors supposed, who fitted it to any body without specifying in which or what 
kind of body, though obviously one chance thing does not receive another" (a23-25). 
The actuality or soul of each organism comes to exist only in what is potentially 
such by nature, i.e. in its own proper matter. 
We have seen that for A. the matter necessary and proper for activation by the 
soul of a blooded animal (including man} is a body generated from and integrated by 
one primary and controlling organ, the heart. Clearly the animal and human soul 
can properly be said to "be in" the whole of such a body as form in its proper matter. 
But could it also be said to "be in" the heart in this sense? Certainly not if this 
is understood in an exclusive sense to mean that the soul is present "in the heart" 
as form in its proper matter but not in the other organs. For they also must be in­
formed and activated by soul to be alive; and a heart is not a heart except as part 
of a living whole, as A. insists. But is there a sense in which the soul can be 
said to be in the heart as form in its proper matter without excluding its presence 
in the other organs? 
Discussing the notion of cause in t!_ Delta 1013a24 ff., A. remarks that "ca11ses 
are spoken of in may senses, and even of those which are of the same kind some are 
causes in a prior and some in a posterior sense" (1013b31-32). Later, discussing 
the material cause of generable natural substances and events in M Eta (1044al5 ff.}, 
he maintains that we must state not only all the causes (material-;- formal, efficient, 
final) but the most proximate (1044b2), i.e. not fire or earth as the material cause 
of man, but that which is proper or peculiar to his form. Turning to the example of 
sleep, he asks what is its proper material, what is the proximate material affected 
(blS-20). The whole animal, he agrees, is certainly affected. But with respect to 
what, and of what proximately? His answer is "the heart, or some other part" (bl8). 
(The "other part" can be disregarded, introduced here for pacific reasons.} And 
what particular affection of that part, and not of the whole animal? It is a special 
kind of immobility, induced in that part (the heart}, the proximate subject. (A. 
assumes the psychophysiology of sleep explained in DSom 456a30 ff.) 
The distinction introduced here between the heart and the whole animal as prox­
imate and secondary material cause may be important. While designating the heart as 
the primary or proximate subject of sleep A. does not deny, but specifically affirms, 
that the whole animal is the subject of sleep. But the whole animal sleeps because 
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of a specific affection or inunobility in the controlling organ. The proper and 
proximate material subject of sleep is the heart; the whole animal is the proper but 
secondary subject of that affection. 
It is possible, then, that when A. speaks of the soul "in the heart• he has in 
mind the heart as primary and proximate material organ of the soul, the controlling 
organ originally informed and activated by the soul, upon which all other organs 
depend for their formation and activation by the soul. They too live� i.e., are in­
formed and activated by the soul, but in a way which is secondary and more remote. 
To speak of the soul as existing "in the heart", then, is not to deny its presence 
in the other organs but only to indicate the primary and proximate subject it informs 
and activates. A heart would be no heart if not part of a living whole. 
A. uses another difficult phrase when he speaks of a certain part of the body 
that "possesses" the sensitive soul ( lv • • •  � µop t<e• • •  !xov-r1. athf}v: �em 450a29) • 
This suggests an exlusive possession incompatible with hylomorphism. And it is in­
compatible if understood in the sense that a part of the body "possesses" or "holds" 
the sensitive soul "as the container holds the contained." This is the third sense 
of the verb "to possess, to hold" ( �x�a.v) distinguished by A. in M Delta l023a8-25 
and illustrated by the example "as the jar hold s the liquid" (alS-16). Obviously 
this sense brings us back to that strict localization in space which for A. is in­
applicable to the immaterial soul. He must be using the verb in another sense, 
probably the second, which he explains thus: (al2-13): "We say something �possesses' 
or 'holds' another when the other is present in it as in receptive material, e.g. as 
the bronze 'possesses' or 'holds' the shape of the statue." In this sense a certain 
part of the body (the heart) would "possess" the sensitive soul as the material organ 
"possesses" its form. As we have seen, this need not imply that other organs do not 
"possess" the sensitive soul, but only that the one organ, the heart, "possesses" it 
primarily as proximate material causeo 
What of the troublesome passage at the end of DMA 703a28 ff.? There A., after 
describing the psychophysiology of the origin of motion in the heart, compares the 
animal organism to a well governed city-state where, once a constitutional order is 
set up, there is no need for several separate monarchs to preside over various areas 
of operation, since each individual performs his function as ordered under a single 
source of conunand. The same, he says, comes about in the animal organism through 
natural growth and structure, each part formed by nature to fulfill its proper func­
tion, so that -- and here is the difficult sta.f.ement (703a36-b2) -- "there is no 
need for soul to be in each part c_lv ex&.O"r<t> &1.va1.), but with the soul being present 
in some center of control ( ttpxTJ !_or 'central origin of authority', Peck, Loeb 477/) 
over the body, the other parts live by organic unity with it ( npoon&�ox&va1. : cf. M 
1014b20-23) and perform their own functions through their natural formation." 
It seems clear from the nature of the treatise and the inunediate context that 
A. is thinking here of the soul not as formal but as efficient cause, and is de­
scribing particularly how and where the soul initiates movement or change in the ani­
mal body so as to control its functions and locomotion. He is insisting that under 
this aspect the soul occupies and operates from only� control center, the heart. 
This is a brief echoe of a point he makes constantly and at length in DPA, namely, 
that one source and center of control is best (657b20-21; 665bl4-16; 666al4) and 
that this is the heart, which occupies the center, the place of leadership and com­
mand (665al0-13; 665bl8-21). Ultimately, as we have seen, A. links this with the 
unity of the animal soul. "The sensory soul is, in all animals, one actually; there­
fore the part which primarily ( n�) possesses this soul is also one • • •  " (667b23-
-
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2 ) h t . th h t . h 1 . ·1 . 1 . \ 4 • Here A. c arac er1zes e ear as possessing t e sou pr1mar1 y, imp ying 
that the other organs possess it, but in a secondary mode, i.e. not as control 
centers but as controlled .  The soul �originating change and controlling the � 
functions is present in the heart in a way in which it is not present in other organs. 
Aristotle apparently makes this point against other thinkers (Plato?) who pos­
tulate more than one control center in the animal. At nPA 665b27-29 he criticizes 
certain persons who claim that the source of the blood-vessels is in the head, on 
the ground that "first of all they set up many control centers (<l.pxat ) scattered 
about." He may have these in mind in DMA 703a31-33: There is no more need for sep­
arate control centers in different parts of the animal organism than there is for 
separate monarchs to occupy and oversee different sections of a well organized city­
state . In the animal organism, as in the body politic, one center of control is 
best. 
Among the various ways one thing is said to "be in" another, listed at Physics 
210al4 ff., A. distinguishes the sixth way thus: "As the affairs of the Hellenes 
are said to 'be in' the king and, in general, as something is said to 'be in' the 
primary agent of motion or change" ( lv � n� x�vT}'C'�lUt>: 210a21-22). This may be 
the meaning A. has in mind with regard to the soul andthe heart at DMA 403a37: As 
the "affairs of the Hellenes
'
" are in the whole social organism so the animal soul 
is in the whole animal organism. But as the affairs of the Hellenes are "in the 
king" in a special way so the animal soul is present "in the heart" alone in the 
same special way, i.e. as in the primary source of change and control. 
